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BOOK REVIEWS 
DA VID E. BEHRMAN* 
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, 2d ed. By JAMES R. 
ATWOOD AND KINGMAN BREWSTER. Colorado Springs, Colorado: Shepard's/ 
McGraw-Hill, 1981,2 YOlumes, 884 pp. $120.00, cloth. 
American antitrust statutes apply to both domestic and foreign commerce.! 
Nevertheless, American antitrust doctrine has evolved almost exclusively in the 
domestic context. In an increasingly interdependent world economy, American 
COllrts now face the problem of what to do when these doctrines, applied to 
foreign parties, run head-on into contrary foreign notions of antitrust and trade 
regulation. 
The second edition of Antitrust and American Business Abroad, by James R. 
Atwood and Kingman Brewster,2 deals with a number of the issues that have 
arisen as American antitrust confronts the modern realities of international 
trade. The book serves two functions. It explores current antitrust doctrine and 
the way that doctrine treats various business problems; in this respect it serves as 
a practical tool for the counsellor and litigant.:1 The book is also prescriptive; the 
authors venture beyond precedent to recommend, in light of the problems they 
describe, modifications of present law. 
Because of this dual emphasis, and the vast body of existing antitrust law, the 
book lacks a central theme. Instead, it focuses sequentially on variolls policy 
problems associated with antitrust and foreign trade. 
Part One describes the decline of U.S. dominance of international markets," 
and the rise of comity-oriented antitrust analysis. Most important, it analyzes 
foreign reaction to the application of American antitrust law beyond U.S. bor-
* B.A. 1977 Haverford College; J.D. 1981 Stanford University. Member of the California Bar. Mr. 
Behrman is in private practice with the law firm of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison in San Francisco. 
1. See, e.g., Sherman Act § I, 15 U.s.c. § I (1976) which covers "Every contract ... in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations . ... " 
2. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981) [hereinaf~ 
ter cited as ATWOOD & BREWSTERI. 
3. 1 id. at iii. 
4. lid. § 1.01, at 4. 
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ders. This reaction, a result of differing notions of antitrust's role,5 now threat-
ens cooperative relationships among various national enforcement authorities6 
and, according to Atwood and Brewster, stems from a combination of differing 
economic interests/ varying notions of competition,S and the political inflexibil-
ity of U.S. courts. 9 
Part Two discusses the extent to which American antitrust covers foreign 
persons and acts. The authors note a trend toward greater jurisdictional reach 
over persons. IO They review jurisdiction over foreign acts,!1 describing its evolu-
tion from the "effects" test of the Alcoa decision l2 to the 'jurisdictional rule of 
reason" test of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America. 13 The latter test, a comity 
analysis, balances U.S. and foreign interests in assessing the propriety of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction, and has been well received by other U.S. courts.14 
Atwood and Brewster also examine the applicability of domestic antitrust 
doctrine in the international context, especially in light of the vastly different 
policy considerations which are involved in an international antitrust suit. They 
note that many per se rules of illegality may be inappropriate internationally, 
and that a rule of reason analysis may also differ when foreign parties are 
involved.15 Furthermore, special concerns exist when a foreign government is a 
party to an international transaction.16 The United States should not apply 
domestic rules to international antitrust before these factors are considered. 
5. lid. § 4.03. 
6. See infra notes 23-38 and accompanying text. 
7. I ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 4.04. 
8. lid. § 4.03. 
9. lid. §§ 4.10-.11. See lid. § 2.19 at 38. The authors state: "Exactly how to incorporate foreign views 
into the rather rigidly legalistic American system is an issue with which both the government and the 
courts are now grappling." [d. 
10. lid. § 5.10, at 123. 
II. lid. §§ 6.05-.10. 
12. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945). 
13. 549 F.2d 597, 613 & n.29 (9th Cir. 1976). 
14. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
15. I ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 2, §§ 7.18-.21. Thus, per se rules apply to practices which the 
court can characterize as "manifestly anticompetitive." Continental T.V .• Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.. 433 
U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977). In the international context. it may be difficult to judge whether behavior is 
manifestly anticompetitive. Atwood and Brewster note several reasons why domestically anticompetitive 
practices may not be harmful internationally: the impossibility of any trade at all in the absence of a 
practice or restraint. I ATWOOD & BREWSTER. supra note 2, § 7.19; the lack of effect on U.S. commerce. I 
id. § 7.20; and the courts' lack of expertise in the rapidly changing area of international trade. I id. 
§ 7.21. For example. a horizontal price-fixing arrangement - clearly a domestic per se violation - might 
in a foreign market be legal under U.S. law if there was no effect on domestic commerce. See § 7.21 at 
207. Cooperation in a cartel "[ilf it operates merely to restrain trade within or among foreign markets 
. . . may not be in the Sherman Act's reach at aiL" [d. 
16. 1 ATWOOD & BREWSTER,supra note 2. ch. 8. The presence ofa foreign government may indicate 
that important national policies of that country are implicated. U.S. courts may wish to defer to these 
concerns. or at least assess whether they are outweighed by affected U.S. interests. See Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1978). On the other hand. transactions of the 
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Part Three emphasizes precedent and policy considerations, and explores the 
treatment of particular business arrangements by antitrust laws. This section 
should be of great aid to a practitioner in assessing the antitrust implications of 
various business practices. Finally, Parts Four and Five examine current adminis-
tration of the law, suggesting changes in substantive antitrust doctrine and in 
procedure to make them more compatible with foreign policy considerations. 
Antitrust and American Business Abroad will be valuable to the practitioner for its 
discussion of the state of the law. Because the authors also discuss the intricacies 
of various American enforcement mechanisms!7 - who is charged with en-
forcement, the available means of discovery, what sanctions may be imposed - it 
will help the counsellor to anticipate the consequences of antitrust liability. 
Equally important, the book's focus on political and economic considerations 
should promote a greater understanding of the problems facing international 
antitrust enforcement, and will assist those who wish to develop new antitrust 
doctrine. 
One of the most difficult problems facing American antitrust today is the 
increasing fury it creates abroad.!H In the last several years it has generated such 
hostility that foreign governments have taken retaliatory action aimed at frus-
trating its enforcement.!9 
Atwood and Brewster are aware of the tension between U.S. and foreign 
antitrust doctrine,20 and they propose a twofold resolution: eliminate the 
treble-damage remedy in international actions - or at least establish a presump-
tion of single damages2! - and encourage a "multivariable comity approach" by 
U.S. courts when they extend the reach of antitrust beyond U.S. borders.22 But 
the authors' proposal seems inadequate. It asks the courts to balance foreign 
policy considerations against what traditionally have been fundamental rights of 
antitrust plaintiffs. Ultimately this is a political decision, and a task that courts 
seem ill-equipped to perform. 
Conflicts between American and foreign trade regulation are inevitable.23 The 
most routine commercial nature. with state-controlled economies. take place between U.S. firms and the 
arms of foreign governments. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978). 
17. 2 id. pt. IV. 
18. See A. NEALE & D. OWDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 356-69 (3d 
ed. 1980); Silkin, The Perception of the Attorney General of England and Wales. in PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL ApPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 28 U. Griffin ed. 1979); Wil-
loughby, Remarks by an English Solicitor, in id. at 56. 
For a discussion of foreign reaction to the Swiss Watchmakers case, see H. STEINER & D. V AGTS. 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1040-46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as STEINER & VAGTS]. 
19. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text, infra. 
20. See 2 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 2, §§ 16.33-.34. 
21. 2 id. § 18.32, at 341. 
22. lid. § 6.21, at 180. 
23. In fact, they may be irreconcilable. See In re Uranium Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 
(N.D. Ill. 1979), where the court refused to engage in a balancing process because "[t]he competing 
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most important goal of American antitrust is protecting competition.24 Any 
regulatory deviation from this norm must come from Congress; the courts are 
not free to weigh other interests against competition.25 
Foreign nations, however, often give greater weight to policy interests other 
than competition.26 Supervision of industrial and commercial decisions - deci-
sions made by the private sector in the United States - is often pervasiveP 
While foreign governments should certainly have the right to promote their own 
definition of self-interest, foreign regulation may prevent U.S. enforcement of 
its own antitrust policies, specifically the protection of competition.28 There are 
no right or wrong positions, only deep-seated and differing notions about the 
role of government and the purpose of regulation. Conflicts are inevitable in the 
face of these differences, and they require political resolution. 
Conflicts with foreign law have arisen on three levels. Most fundamentally, 
substantive American antitrust doctrine often conflicts with foreign law. Assert-
ing jurisdiction over a foreign party for an act which is not illegal abroad may be 
highly offensive to a sovereign nation. And the potential liability, even against a 
private party, may threaten foreign national interests. In re Uranium Antitrust 
Litigation29 is an illustration of an antitrust claim so massive that the United 
Kingdom perceives its national interests to be threatened by the claim.30 How-
ever, if U.S. courts are to protect American consumers from anticompetitive 
acts,31 they must be willing to assert such jurisdiction. For example, foreign 
exporters might form a cartel, thereby raising export prices paid by U.S. con-
interests ... display[ed] an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy." Id. at 
1148. If these conflicts are irreconcilable, the courts should not be faulted for failing to resolve them. 
However, before policymakers abandon hope of harmonizing U.S. and foreign law, new solutions 
should be tried. 
24. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, REpORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1 
(1955). 
25. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
26. See 1 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 2, §§ 4.02-.03; 2 id. §§ 13.15, 13.20. 
27. For example, the japanese government operates an agency to coordinate the steel industry. 
japanese Steelmair£rs Thrive With tir£ Aid of Government Body, WaIl St. J., Apr. 10, 1981, at I, col. 1. See 
generally R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN 148-54 (1976) (discussing the 
extensive nature of japanese governmental control over industry). 
28. See, e.g., Is The U.S. Sabotaging its International Airlines' Bus. WEEK 74 Gan. 26, 1981) (arguing that 
enforcing competition among international airlines is harmful in the face of competition from regu-
lated and subsidized foreign carriers). 
Of course, the U.S. government subsidizes "industry, as well. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 635a-n (1976) 
(export loan guarantees from the Export-Import Bank); 15 U.S.C. §§ 631, 1861-75,2003,2412 (Supp. 
III 1979) (Chrysler Corp. loan guarantees); 46 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1280 (1976) (ship mortgage guarantees). 
29. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See generally 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 515 (1980). 
30. See, e.g., Danaher, Anti-Antitrust Law: The Clawback and Other Features of the United Kingdom 
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 12 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 947,948 (1980) (effect of private suits on 
important British industries). 
31. Anticompetitive. of course, in the eyes of U.S. antitrust law. A foreign government may not see 
them in the same light. 
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sumers. Courts must be able to assert jurisdiction over these sellers to effectively 
protect American buyers.32 
Second, antitrust enforcement mechanisms - the means by which these dif-
fering notions are implemented - also cause conflicts with foreign systems. 
American criminal antitrust provisions33 are unique; almost no statutory trade 
regulation is punitive.34 Treble damages awarded to successful private plaintiffs 
are also unique to U.S. antitrust. 35 
A third area has recently emerged as a potent source of conflict: discovery of 
evidence located abroad. Just as jurisdiction over foreign parties may be neces-
sary to protect American consumers, discovery must be available to facilitate 
proof of antitrust claims. But the voluminous discovery process intrinsic to 
American antitrust litigation vastly exceeds the scope of inquiry permitted by 
foreign law.a6 In the Uranium litigation, discovery requests aimed at foreign 
parties greatly offended foreign governments. The United Kingdom passed 
retaliatory legislation, partly in response to the affront caused by the discovery 
process.37 
Fundamentally different notions of the role courts should play in the inves-
tigative process causes much of the conflict over discovery. In the U.S., discovery 
is a broad tool supervised by the courts, and is used with general notice pleading 
to disclose and narrow the issues involved in Iitigation. 3H Foreign discovery 
procedures are generally much more restricted. 39 Atwood and Brewster suggest 
that conflicts over discovery may worsen, pointing out that courts have recently 
taken a hard line against foreign defendants which invoke foreign blocking 
statutes in civil discovery and claim that evidence is therefore unavailable. 40 
Foreign governments have retaliated against perceived threats to their na-
32. The necessity of jurisdiction is reflected in the "effects" test of the Alcoa case. See note 12 and 
accompany text supra. Under this test, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whenever an 
act produces a substantial effect on U.S. commerce. It is somewhat moderated by the 'Jurisdictional rule 
ofreason" of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976), which 
allows for a comity-oriented balancing approach. 
33. E.g., Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). 
34. Jacobs & Hove,Remediesfor Unfair ImportCompetitinn in the U.S., 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1,3 (1980). 
35. The United Kingdom has expressed extreme displeasure over the notion of treble damages. 2 
ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 2, §§ 14.19 at 203-04, 16.07. 
36. American discovery procedures are much more permissive than foreign procedures; civil law 
discovery is a judicial, rather than a private, function. 2 id. § 15.10. 
37. See Danaher, supra note 30, at 947-49. Cf Becker, The Antitrust Law and Relations with Foreign 
Nations, 40 DEP'T STATE BULL. 272, 275 (1959) ("Trial or discussion in open court of issues of the foreign 
policy of the United States with regard to one or more foreign countries would exacerbate rather than 
solve our foreign relations problems."). 
38. See United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 
495, 500 (1947). 
39. 2 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 15.10. 
40. 2 id. § 15.06 at 223. Courts are reluctant to recognize comity limitations on discovery, 2 id. § 
15.16, at 233, perhaps because the legitimacy of the claim is uncertain at this stage in the proceedings. 
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tional interests and prying by the American judicial system. They have passed 
so-called blocking statutes, which prohibit foreign parties from complying with 
U.S. discovery requests,41 and c1awback provisions, which allow those foreign 
defendants found liable in antitrust actions to recover two-thirds of the assessed 
damagesY Both types of statutes serve to frustrate the application of U.S. 
antitrust law. 
These statutes represent a twofold failure in the attempt to reconcile Amer-
ican and foreign antitrust. Clawbacks, which attempt to frustrate American law, 
reflect a lack of accommodation between two sets of divergent substantive law. 
Such attempts seem likely to prompt American retaliation in turn. 43 Blocking 
statutes reflect the inability of U.S. and foreign enforcement authorities to 
develop mutually agreeable systems of international trial cooperation. 
American legal doctrine has proved inadequate to reconcile U.S. and foreign 
law. The act of state44 and sovereign immunity45 doctrines give courts some 
flexibility in avoiding offense to foreign governments. But sovereign immunity is 
unavailable in disputes over the ordinary commercial acts of a foreign state.46 
And courts may be unwilling to apply the doctrine early in ajudicial proceeding, 
before each side has had an opportunity to develop evidenceY As a result, 
discovery, with its concomitant potential for foreign offense, will continue 
largely unchecked. 
It is hardly surprising that the courts have been unable to resolve these 
differences. The United States and its trading partners are trying to implement 
vastly divergent, possibly incompatible, views of economic regulation and judicial 
dispute resolution. A compromise, in which each side sacrifices some of its 
interests, will be necessary before the various national antitrust systems can 
function harmoniously.48 
41. See, e.g., Foreign Antitrust Judgements (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, No. 13 of 1979, [1979] 
ACTS AUSTL. P. 142 (Australia); Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Great Britain); 
Protection of Businesses Act, No. 99 of 1978, amended by Protection of Businesses Amendment Act, 
No. 114 of 1979 (Republic of South Africa). Similar legislation is before the Parliament of Canada. Bill 
c-41, 1st Sess., 32d Parliament, 29 Eliz. II (1980). 
42. See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. II, § 6 (Great Britain), which permits recovery 
by the defendant of the punitive portion of an antitrust judgment. 
43. See 2 ATWOOD & BREWSTER,supra note 2, § 16.34, at 282 (suggesting that in some circumstances it 
may be appropriate for courts to direct foreign defendants not to invoke foreign clawback provisions). 
If the full force of U.S. antitrust law is to be brought to bear against foreign defendants, then U.S. 
courts will have to, in some way, frustrate the effect of the clawbacks. Acquiescence in the clawbacks 
would, in effect, allow a foreign repeal of part of the U.S. antitrust laws. 
44. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
45. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 
(1976). 
46. [d. § 1605. 
47. See note 40 supra. 
48. See STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 18, at 807. "In view of the diversity among legal systems ... 
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But courts are ill-equipped to reach such compromises. Until a case reaches 
the Supreme Court, U.S. courts speak with many voices, a phenomenon no 
doubt confusing for a foreign government trying to identify the U.S. position. 
Nor are courts trained in foreign affairs;49 they may be unaware of other 
national interests which are implicated in antitrust disputes. 5o Through insen-
sitivity, they may insult foreign governments.51 Most importantly, when courts 
identify particular interests as fundamentally important - for example, protec-
tion of competition - they are unable, or at least extraordinarily reluctant, to 
compromise those interests in the name of comity and foreign relations.52 
Conflicts over antitrust are generated by deeply-held and divergent sets of 
national beliefs. If the United States is to take part in a compromise of these 
beliefs, the executive branch must be given the resources to reach international 
agreements. Specifically, Congress must recognize that in any compromise be-
tween conflicting systems, certain rights and remedies must be sacrificed,53 and it 
should, therefore, amend the antitrust laws to give the President more discretion 
over international enforcement as a first step toward negotiation. Of course, 
Congress could simply reduce the scope of American antitrust to alleviate inter-
national tensions. But reciprocity is a cornerstone of international agreements.54 
treaties would appear to be the best means for establishing an effective international legal order 
responsive to the contemporary needs of the international community." Id. 
International law is established in two ways: through customary practice which is accepted by all 
nations or by written treaty. Lenhoff, Reciprocity, The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U. L.R. 619, 
622 (\ 954). The former alternative is unavailable; therefore, treaties are the only way to reconcile the 
various antitrust regimes. 
International antitrust agreements do exist. However, their requirements are vague. Such agree-
ments are easily avoided and it is apparent that neither side sacrifices a great deal by entering into one. 
See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 
1976, United States - Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291. 
49. I ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 2, §§ 4.02 at 85,6.16 at 172-73. 
50. See, e.g., AT&T Suit's Dismissal Urged By Defense Chief, Citing Nation's Security, Wall. St. J. April 8, 
1981, at 6, col. I (Secretary of Defense Weinberger asserted a national security interest in the outcome 
of the Department of Justice suit against American Telephone & Telegraph). 
51. E.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980). The court stated: 
"[S]hockingly to us, the governments of the defaulters have subserviently presented for them their case 
against the exercise of jurisdiction .... " Id. This language caused "serious embarrassment" to the U.S. 
See letter to John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General, Antitrust Division, from Robert B. Owen, 
Legal Adviser, Department of State, reprinted in Nash, Contemporary Practice oj the United States Relnting to 
International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 665 (\980). The Department of Justice later filed a formal 
statement of interest in the case. 5 TRADE REG. REp. (CCH). ~ 50,416. 
52. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (held that 
antitrust analysis should assess the "competitive significance" of a restraint. Any deviation from the 
norm of competition must come from Congress.). 
53. Securing political support for agreements, without acknowledging that some concessions have 
been made, risks reinforcing protectionist sentiments, and places the agreement in danger once 
knowledge of those concessions becomes widespread. See K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 65 (1970). The fundamental defect of reciprocal trade agreements was 
that they failed to acknowledge that concessions were being made. 
54. STEINER & V AGTS, supra note 18, at 627. See Lenhoff, supra note 48, at 629; K. DAM, supra note 53, 
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It is certainly in the interest of the United States to extract maximum concessions 
from foreign governments in return for such a cutback, and unilateral action will 
not accomplish that end.55 
Only if the President is able to make credible commitments to remove the most 
offensive aspects of U.S. antitrust law will foreign nations be willing to make 
reciprocal concessions. Therefore, Congress should authorize the President to 
negotiate agreements which clearly define the extraterritorial scope of U.S. 
antitrust law. Although any such agreements will almost certainly reduce its 
current scope, foreign nations should be willing, in return, to cooperate more 
fully with American antitrust discovery and enforcement, or to use their trade 
laws to promote a new and mutually satisfactory definition of impermissible 
anticompetitive acts. Without such an agreement, adverse foreign reaction to 
U.S. antitrust will probably continue, followed, in all likelihood, by American 
retaliatory legislation and deteriorating antitrust cooperation. 
Compromise between the U.S. and its trading partners could take many 
forms. For example, a foreign government might identify enterprises which are 
vital to its national interests, and the U.S. could then agree not to recognize 
lawsuits against those enterprises. Alternatively, particular business practices, 
important to a foreign government's national interest, could be identified by that 
government and declared exempt from the scope of U.S. law. And discovery 
requests could be screened or controlled by an international tribunal whose 
decisions would be binding on all parties. 
Concessions from abroad would come as particular business practices and 
foreign parties were omitted from the protected lists. American antitrust en-
forcement authorities could legitimately expect foreign cooperation in actions 
against such practices and persons, since by omitting them from the protected 
list, a foreign government will have indicated that its important national interests 
are not implicated. Thus, the process of negotiating agreements will help define 
those foreign interests with which U.S. courts should not interfere, and in return 
the courts should receive greater cooperation from foreign authorities in discov-
ery and enforcement when those interests are not implicated. 
These agreements would have a number of advantages over the current 
system of ad hoc dispute resolution. They would force governments to identify 
their own vital interests, and to balance these interests against those of other 
nations. To obtain protection or immunization for an industry, a nation would 
have to trade off cooperation in other areas. This process would force govern-
at 54. It has played an important part of many international agreements. See S. REp. No. 96-249, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. I (1979) (tariff concessions apply only on a reciprocal basis); S. REp. No. 93-1298, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 u.s. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7186, 7199 (goal of trade negotiations 
is full reciprocity). 
55. Cf S. REp. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
7186, 7243 (unconditional grants of most-favored-nation treatment have led to one-sided agreements). 
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ments to evaluate the worth of each interest, rather than granting blanket 
immunity to their industries and nationals through blocking statutes and claw-
backs. 
Negotiated agreements are also advantageous because they inject certainty 
into international transactions. Under these agreements, businesses would be 
able to predict the antitrust consequences of their actions. Prospective plaintiffs 
would be aware of any implicated foreign interests and, therefore, of the viability 
of their claims. And the courts would be able to refer to the agreements, in some 
cases, for definitive rules on the coverage of antitrust laws. 
Once agreements are in place, Congress should authorize the President to 
remove the immunization of protected foreign parties or practices in the event 
of foreign noncompliance with the agreements. The President's ability to quickly 
impose retaliatory sanctions will itself help deter foreign deviation from 
negotiated agreements.56 Furthermore, foreign governments vest much greater 
discretion over trade regulation in administrative hands,57 making foreign trade 
regulation more adaptable to changing political and economic conditions. Amer-
ican antitrust enforcement should be equally flexible. 
This proposal certainly goes beyond current antitrust dispute resolution. But 
American antitrust authorities face, in the international context, a set of political 
constraints which are absent domestically. A number of co-equal enforcement 
agencies are present. Some nations prohibit, while others encourage, the same 
forms of behavior. Clearly, the present system has failed and a new system 
should be developed. 
Furthermore, the proposal is not without precedent. Congress faced similar 
problems - the need to establish reciprocal agreements and the concomitant 
need for centralized negotiating authority - in the area of tariffs and trade 
barriers, and responded by passing the Trade Act of 1974.5H This Act authorized 
the President to negotiate tariff reductions, subject only to Congressional veto of 
the package as a whole. 59 Thus, Congress delegated negotiating authority in an 
56. Reciprocity and retaliation are interrelated concepts. STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 18, at 627. 
The ability to retaliate ensures a state that if a treaty or agreement partner fails to adhere to part of an 
agreement - which would make the agreement nonreciprocal - it can reduce or eliminate its 
compliance, thereby reestablishing reciprocity. Retaliation is a common way for an injured state to 
respond to a partial breach without abrogating the entire agreement. A. McNAIR, THE LAw OF TREATIES 
573 (2d ed. 1961). Dam has pointed out that prohibiting withdrawal of concessions discourages a 
government from making them in the first place. K. DAM; supra note 53, at 80. See id. at 81 (retaliation 
and other self help is at the heart of GATT). See also Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2136(b) (1976). 
(GATT retaliation); Walker, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1964) (example 
of the operation of retaliatory tariffs). 
57. For example, the U.K. blocking statute is invoked at the discretion of the British Secretary of 
State. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. II, §§ 4-5 (Great Britain). 
58. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975). 
59. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976). 
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area, international trade regulation, over which it has ultimate constitutional 
aut hority. nO 
Increased centralization of American antitrust authority should facilitate the 
harmonization of various nations' antitrust laws, and a reduction in the political 
tensions which are now present. Reciprocal negotiations over tariff levels have 
produced large-scale tariff reductions. HI As in the case of tariffs, unilateral 
antitrust concessions will seldom occur - it is in no nation's self-interest to make 
such concessions. But the process of negotiating international antitrust agree-
ments will force nations to define more clearly the goals they seek to promote 
through antitrust and trade regulation. Ultimately bi- or multi-lateral agree-
ments offer the best chance to achieve at least some degree of international 
compromise. 
Antitrust and American Business Abroad seems certain to play an important role in 
the development of the jurisprudence of international antitrust. As noted ear-
lier, the book will serve as a valuable resource for the litigant, counsellor and 
scholar. Far more important, however, is the understanding that the authors 
bring to the difficulties facing antitrust law as it is applied to a world economy 
completely unforeseen at the time that much of the law was developed. The 
reader may differ with Atwood and Brewster on specific proposals. However, 
the authors' analysis provides a finn foundation for policy discussion and formu-
lation. Finally, only when Congress and the courts acquire at least some measure 
of the authors' sensitivity to foreign concerns will there be a real hope for 
reconciling American and foreign antitrust. 
60. U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. Even outright discretionary authority of the President over specific 
litigation may be authorized in the international context. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,283,46 Fed. 
Reg. 7,927 (1981) (barring all claims in U.S. courts against the government of Iran arising from seizure 
of 52 American hostages); Exec. Order No. 12,294,46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981) (referring all claims 
against Iran to the Iran-United States Claims Commission for final and binding resolution). But cf 
Electronic Data Systems Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, No. CA3-79-0218-F, memo at 
25 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 1981), reprinted in C. BROWER, L. MARKS, & J. OLSON, AFTER ALGIERS: PROTECT-
ING AND PERFECTING AMERICAN CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN 101, 125 (1981) (held a related Executive Order 
unconstitutional, but partly on the grounds that it was issued after issuance of a final judgment); 
National Airmotive Corp. v. Government of Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401,405 (D.D.C. 1980) (stated in dicta 
that it is doubtful that the Executive can regulate operations of the courts with regard to a particular 
subject matter). 
61. K. DAM, supra note 53, at 56. 
